TF, 12.10.2026, 7B_52/2026
Facts
The Vaud Public Prosecutor's Office is conducting a criminal investigation into several defendants suspected of operating fake stock market investment websites to misappropriate investments from dozens of victims, resulting in losses exceeding 1.7 million francs. By order of July 15, 2025, it compelled several Internet service providers, including A.________ AG, to block certain web addresses via their DNS resolvers, under threat ofArt. 292 of the Swiss Criminal Code. This measure consists of preventing the correspondence between web addresses and the IP addresses of the sites in question, thereby making them inaccessible by this means. After the cantonal appeal was rejected, A.________ AG appealed to the Federal Supreme Court, challenging the existence of a sufficient legal basis to order such a block (considerations 2.1 and 2.4.1).
Law
A criminal seizure is a provisional coercive measure subject to the conditions ofArt. 197 of the Swiss Criminal Procedure Code, specifically legality, sufficient suspicion, and proportionality.Art. 263 para. 1 let. d of the Swiss Criminal Procedure Code allows for the seizure of objects subject to confiscation. According toArt. 69 para. 1 of the Swiss Criminal Code, security confiscation requires a link between the object and an offense, as well as a future danger to the safety of persons, morality, or public order. It grants the State the power to dispose of the object in question. Seizure aims to preserve this possibility of confiscation (consideration 2.2).
The question of whether a web address constitutes an object subject to confiscation within the meaning of Art. 69 of the Swiss Criminal Code remains open. However, the Federal Supreme Court distinguishes this scenario from a DNS block imposed on an access provider, which does not transfer any control over the domain name to the State. The literal and historical interpretations of Art. 69 of the Swiss Criminal Code and 263 of the Swiss Criminal Procedure Code do not definitively resolve the issue (considerations 2.3 and 2.5.2-2.5.3).
Systematic interpretation is decisive: the legislature has expressly provided for specific blocking mechanisms in the Federal Act on the Intelligence Service, the Telecommunications Act, and the Unfair Competition Act, accompanied by specific conditions and safeguards. Allowing a DNS block solely on the basis of general provisions relating to seizure and confiscation would deprive these special regimes of their purpose. Any extension therefore requires legislative intervention (considerations 2.5.4-2.5.7).
Application to the specific case
The contested measure does not concern the seizure of data stored on DNS servers, but rather the technical neutralization of web addresses. Unlike confiscation, it primarily affects Swiss access providers and their users, without preventing access to the sites via foreign providers. Its preventive purpose is therefore insufficient to classify it as a protective measure (considerations 2.3.2 and 2.5.5).
Although a DNS block can effectively prevent online fraud, its impact on all Swiss internet users raises significant questions of proportionality. It is up to the legislature to determine the offenses concerned, the competent authorities, and the conditions for a provisional or definitive block. The Federal Supreme Court cannot fill this regulatory gap through jurisprudence (considerations 2.5.6-2.5.7).
Outcome
Appeal allowed. Art. 69 para. 1 of the Swiss Criminal Code and Art. 263 para. 1 let. d of the Swiss Criminal Procedure Code do not constitute a sufficient legal basis to impose a DNS block on an Internet service provider. The cantonal judgment is set aside and the seizure order against the appellant is immediately lifted. The Canton of Vaud shall pay the appellant 2,000 francs in costs, with no federal court fees (considerations 2.6 and 3).