FPC, 06.07.2026, RR.2025.123
Facts
The German Federal Public Prosecutor is conducting proceedings against A., a German-Swiss national residing in Switzerland, and several other defendants, notably in connection with the "Königreich Deutschland" (KRD). On May 5, 2025, Germany requested mutual legal assistance from Switzerland, specifically to search A.'s residence in the canton of Solothurn. The Solothurn Public Prosecutor's Office accepted the request, finding prima facie evidence of a potential violation of Articles 46 and 49 of the Banking Act as well as Article 87 of the Financial Institutions Act and ordered the search. On May 13, 2025, a Google Pixel and a MacBook were seized, among other items (recitals 5.3, 5.4, and 6.6).
A. requested that the devices be sealed. However, the Compulsory Measures Court ordered the seals to be lifted, finding that A. had not sufficiently specified which data was allegedly covered by attorney-client privilege. In a final decision dated July 15, 2025, the Public Prosecutor's Office granted mutual legal assistance and ordered the handover of the devices and the records to the German authorities. A. appealed to the FPC, primarily requesting the annulment or a declaration of nullity of the decisions, alternatively the refusal of mutual legal assistance, and, more subsidiarily, a judicial review of the data (recitals 2.1–3.2 and 7.1–7.5).
The KRD is described by the German authorities as an organization aiming to replace the German legal order with pseudo-state structures and engaging in unauthorized banking and insurance activities. A. allegedly belonged to the movement since 2013, held significant leadership roles, and was considered the "right-hand man" of one of its leaders (recital 5.3).
Law
Mutual legal assistance between Switzerland and Germany is governed primarily by the applicable international conventions, supplemented subsidiarily by the IMAC, the OIMAC, and, for appeal proceedings, by the APA. A., being directly affected by the search and seizure of his devices, has standing to appeal (recitals 1.1–2.2).
An IMAC appeal does not allow for direct review of a violation of cantonal organizational law. WhileArticle 55 of the Criminal Procedure Code assigns the cantonal execution of mutual legal assistance to the public prosecutor's office, the internal distribution of its powers remains largely governed by cantonal law. Nullity is only recognized in the presence of a particularly serious and manifest defect; it is excluded when the authority in question possesses general jurisdiction in the matter (recitals 4.1–4.3.3).
When coercive measures are ordered, the requirement of dual criminality must be met. It is sufficient that the facts described by the requesting state, when transposed to Switzerland, could be subsumed under at least one Swiss offense; identical legal classification is not required. Articles 46 and 49 of the Banking Act and Article 87 of the Financial Institutions Act may be considered, as well asArticle 275 of the Criminal Code (recitals 5.2.1–5.2.3).
The mutual assistance procedure is an administrative process. The rules of the Swiss Criminal Procedure Code (CrimPC) regarding coercive measures apply only by analogy.Art. 63 IMAC provides the legal basis for searches and seizures, whileart. 74 IMAC allows for the handover of evidence to the requesting state. A separate seizure order meeting all the formal requirements of the CrimPC is therefore not necessary (consid. 6.4–6.5).
Attorney-client privilege protects only activities typical of a lawyer, such as legal advice and representation in court. Anyone invoking it must, however, demonstrate the likely existence of protected data and identify it sufficiently, in particular by specifying the lawyer concerned, the mandate, the time period, and, for electronic data, its location. In matters of mutual assistance, this burden of substantiation is particularly important (consid. 7.3–7.4).
Application to the specific case
The complaint regarding the lack of authority of the investigating officer concerns the internal distribution of powers within the Solothurn Public Prosecutor's Office and therefore falls under cantonal law. Nullity is also excluded, as the Public Prosecutor's Office of the Canton of Solothurn itself had general jurisdiction to execute the mutual assistance request (consid. 4.2–4.3.3).
Dual criminality is satisfied, as banking and insurance activities conducted without authorization could fall under Articles 46 and 49 of the Banking Act (BA) as well as Article 87 of the Insurance Supervision Act (ISA). It is therefore irrelevant whether the conditions for a criminal organization within the meaning of Article 260ter of the Swiss Criminal Code are met. The Federal Criminal Court further notes that the facts could also be relevant under Article 275 of the Swiss Criminal Code (consid. 5.4).
The absence of a separate seizure order does not violate the guarantee of property. The decision to initiate proceedings had validly ordered the search and seizure, and the final decision served as the legal basis for the handover to Germany. Furthermore, A. had the opportunity to be heard and to appeal this decision (consid. 6.4–6.6).
Finally, A. essentially limited himself to mentioning a foreign lawyer and a law firm email address. He did not sufficiently specify the mandate, the time period, or the communications concerned. He therefore failed to meet his burden of substantiation during the seal-lifting procedure, the mutual assistance procedure, and before the Federal Criminal Court. A new judicial review was therefore not necessary (consid. 7.5).
Outcome
The appeal is dismissed in its entirety. The Federal Criminal Court rejects the complaints regarding jurisdiction and nullity, accepts dual criminality, confirms the legality of the seizure and the handover of the devices, and finds that attorney-client privilege was not sufficiently invoked. No other obstacles to mutual assistance are identified (consid. 4–8).
Court costs of CHF 5,000 are charged to A. (consid. 9).