TF, 11.05.2026, 6B_880/2025
Facts
A., a municipal councillor in U. since 2011, drafted and co-signed an interpellation regarding the operation of E.. The document, which was also sent to the media along with a press release, addressed, among other things, the granting of a separate and permanent building right (DDP) to F. SA. It stated that the DDP had been established before notary B.________, who was presented as already being a director of the beneficiary company, and noted that an amendment voted on by the Municipal Council had not been transcribed in the deed. The interpellation therefore asked the Municipality whether the situation presented a conflict of interest and how it intended to correct this "error of the past".
These assertions were partially erroneous. The authentic deed had in fact been executed by another notary, and B.________ had only become a director of the company subsequently. On the other hand, the amendment adopted by the Municipal Council had indeed not been transcribed faithfully, but only in part.
The Lausanne Police Court convicted A.________ of defamation, sentencing him to 90 daily penalty units of CHF 240 each, suspended for two years. The Vaud Criminal Court of Appeal upheld this judgment. A.________ appealed to the Federal Supreme Court, invoking in particularArt. 173 SCC as well as his freedom of expression guaranteed by Art. 16 of the Constitution and Art. 10 ECHR.
Legal Grounds
According to Art. 173 para. 1 of the Swiss Criminal Code (SCC), a person is guilty of defamation if, by addressing a third party, they accuse another person of, or cast suspicion upon them for, conduct that is dishonourable or impute to them any other fact that could damage their reputation. The honour protected by criminal law refers to the reputation of being a person worthy of respect. Mere professional or political reputation is generally not protected, unless the remarks impute, for example, an offence or conduct clearly contrary to generally accepted moral standards.
The defamatory nature of a statement is assessed objectively, based on the meaning that an unprejudiced recipient would attribute to the remarks in their context. For a text, one must consider its general meaning rather than isolating specific expressions. Furthermore, it is sufficient to cast suspicion on a person; a categorical assertion is not required. (consid. 1.1.4)
However, Articles 16 of the Constitution and 10 of the ECHR guarantee freedom of expression. This freedom enjoys particularly strong protection in political discourse and debates concerning matters of public interest. The limits of acceptable criticism are broader with regard to public figures. In this context, a distinction must be made between criticism—even if exaggerated or provocative—and gratuitous personal attacks. A criminal restriction must, in particular, meet a pressing social need and remain proportionate to the protection of the reputation of others. (consid. 1.2)
Application to the specific case
The Federal Supreme Court departs from the cantonal assessment. The terms "conflict of interest" and "error" primarily concerned B.________'s professional practice as a notary. In themselves, they were not such as to expose him to contempt as an individual. Questions regarding conflicts of interest are common in legal professions and are not inherently defamatory. Furthermore, A.________ did not use harsh language or accusations of "shady dealings," "dishonesty," or concealment. Moreover, the error regarding the amendment was not entirely unfounded, as it had indeed not been transcribed accurately. The statements could not, therefore, be equated to a criminal denunciation, as the cantonal court had done. (consid. 1.5.2)
The overall context of the document reinforced this conclusion. The interpellation consisted of five pages and twenty questions covering various issues. Only two questions directly or indirectly concerned the conflict of interest and the disputed error, and they appeared at the end of the document. As for the press release, it mentioned neither B.________ nor the disputed accusations, even though the interpellation was attached to it. (consid. 1.5.3)
Above all, contrary to the cantonal assessment, the remarks were part of a public debate of general interest regarding the operation of the E.. A. was acting in his capacity as a municipal councillor. Furthermore, B.________ was not a private individual: as a former member of parliament and a well-known public figure, he had been actively involved in the debate concerning the E.________ and had been portrayed in the media as the appellant's political rival on this issue. He was therefore required to show a higher degree of tolerance toward criticism. The fact that the remarks were made in writing rather than orally did not remove this protection, as public debate constitutes an essential element of direct democracy. (consid. 1.6)
Moreover, A.________ had relied on an official document from the Municipality that was likely to create confusion regarding B.________'s role. The Federal Supreme Court acknowledges that further research would have been desirable, but considers that this source appeared sufficiently solid to justify an interpellation. Imposing excessive verification requirements on part-time elected officials would risk compromising their ability to react and question authorities on matters of public interest.
Under these circumstances, the criminal conviction did not strike a fair balance between B.________'s reputation and A.________'s freedom of expression. As criminal law is a measure of last resort (ultima ratio), a conviction did not meet a pressing social need and risked having a chilling effect on public debate, which is incompatible with Article 10 of the ECHR. (consid. 1.6-1.7)
Outcome
The appeal is upheld, and A.________ is acquitted of the offense of defamation under Article 173 of the Swiss Criminal Code. The case is referred back to the Vaud Cantonal Criminal Court of Appeal for a new decision regarding the costs and legal fees of the cantonal proceedings. A portion of the federal court costs, set at CHF 1,500, is charged to B.. Furthermore, the Canton of Vaud and B. must each pay CHF 1,500 to A.________ for legal fees incurred before the Federal Supreme Court. (consid. 2-3; disp. 1-4)