TPF, 28.07.2026,RR.2026.18
Facts
On December 1, 2025, A. was arrested in Switzerland based on an alert from French authorities in the Schengen Information System (SIS) and was placed in detention pending extradition.
He is suspected of having participated in an assault with a bladed weapon (facts A and B).
On January 22, 2026, the Federal Office of Justice (FOJ) issued a decision authorizing his extradition to France.
This decision was served to A. in prison on February 2, 2026 (fact C).
On February 8, 2026, A. drafted a handwritten appeal against the extradition decision.
This appeal reached the FOJ on February 12, 2026.
The FOJ immediately informed the Appeals Chamber of the Federal Criminal Court (FCC) of the existence of this appeal via email. The Chamber confirmed receipt and reminded the FOJ that the appeal had a suspensive effect (fact D).
On February 13, 2026, the Chamber formally notified the FOJ of the opening of the appeal proceedings. Despite this, on the same day, A. was handed over to the French authorities (fact E).
Law
Extradition may be carried out if the person being prosecuted does not declare their intention to appeal within five days of the notification of the decision (art. 56 para. 1 let. b IMAC).
This is a discretionary power ("Kann-Bestimmung") left to the judgment of the FOJ (recital 3.2.1 and 3.2.2).
Legal scholars criticize this provision, as it can lead to a situation where a person is extradited before the expiry of the ordinary 30-day appeal period, thereby rendering the suspensive effect of the appeal meaningless (recital 3.2.3).
An appeal against an extradition decision has a suspensive effect by operation of law (art. 21 para. 4 let. a IMAC) (recital 3.2.3).
Executing an extradition despite a validly filed and notified appeal is unlawful and may result in an obligation for the State to repatriate the extradited person (recital 3.3.3).
Extradition must be refused if the person is at risk of being subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment contrary toart. 3 ECHR.
However, under the principle of mutual trust, it is presumed that states party to the ECHR, such as France, comply with their obligations.
Guarantees are only required in the presence of concrete and serious indications of a risk of violation (consideration 4.3).
Application to the specific case
The Court first examines the legality of the execution of the extradition. The extradition decision was notified to A. on February 2, 2026.
The five-day deadline to announce an intention to appeal (Art. 56 para. 1 let. b IMAC) expired on Monday, February 9, 2026 (consideration 3.3.1).
A.'s appeal is dated February 8, 2026. Even though it did not reach the FOJ until February 12, it was drafted within the five-day time limit.
Given the transmission delays inherent in the prison system, the Court considers that the intention to appeal was manifested in time (consideration 3.3.1).
Consequently, the FOJ was not entitled to execute the extradition on February 13, 2026.
The extradition was executed while a valid appeal had been filed and the FOJ had been informed of its suspensive effect.
The Court therefore finds that the FOJ violated Art. 56 para. 1 let. b IMAC (considerations 3.3.2, 3.3.3, and 3.4). The Court then examines the merits of the appeal.
The appellant fears for his life in French prisons due to the presence of a mafia (facts, p. 8). The Court considers these allegations to be too general and unsupported by any concrete evidence.
The appellant has not demonstrated the existence of a personal and serious risk of a violation of Art. 3 ECHR (consideration 4.3).
In accordance with practice and the principle of mutual trust, there is no reason to require guarantees from France (consideration 4.3). The appeal on the merits is therefore dismissed (consideration 4.3).
Outcome
The Court formally finds that the FOJ violated Art. 56 para. 1 let. b IMAC by executing the extradition despite a suspensive appeal (operative provision 1).
However, as the appeal is unfounded on its merits, the Court dismisses it (operative provision 2).
This outcome renders any potential repatriation of the appellant moot. No court costs are charged (operative provision 3).