Federal Supreme Court, 02.25.2026, 6B_280/2024
Facts
On May 22, 2018, following an argument regarding an arranged marriage and his daughter's admission of having a sexual relationship with her boyfriend, A.A.________ attempted to strangle her. While in a stationary vehicle, sitting in the back seat behind his daughter in the passenger seat, he first placed a chain around her neck to strangle her. When the victim managed to remove the chain, he continued to squeeze her throat with his bare hands for several seconds until she managed to escape. The victim sustained bruising, redness, and petechiae on her oral mucosa. Convicted at first instance of attempted endangerment of life and sentenced to a two-year suspended prison term and a seven-year expulsion from the country, A.A.________ had his judgment upheld on appeal by the Cantonal Court of St. Gallen. He is appealing to the Federal Supreme Court, requesting his acquittal.
Law
The Federal Supreme Court reiterates the conditions for the offense of endangerment of life (Art. 129 SCC). The perpetrator must, in a "scrupulous" manner (i.e., without scruples, recklessly, or without restraint), create a concrete and immediate danger of death for a person. Subjectively, the offense requires direct intent: the perpetrator must have intended or accepted the creation of this danger as certain; conditional intent is not sufficient. An attempt (Art. 22 SCC) occurs when the perpetrator has begun the execution of a crime or misdemeanor but the act is not completed or the result does not occur. Case law recognizes the attempt to endanger life. The Federal Supreme Court also reiterates the principle of the prohibition of reformatio in peius (Art. 391 para. 2 CrimPC), which prohibits the appellate authority from modifying a decision to the detriment of the accused when only the latter has appealed. Finally, a finding of fact is considered arbitrary (Art. 97 para. 1 LTF) only if it is manifestly unsustainable, and the grievance must be decisive for the outcome of the proceedings.
Application to the specific case
The appellant contests the establishment of the facts, in particular the creation of an immediate danger of death. The Federal Supreme Court declares this grievance inadmissible. Indeed, the appellant was only convicted of an attempt. The previous instance, bound by the prohibition of reformatio in peius (the court of first instance having denied the immediate danger), could not in any case have convicted him of the completed offense. Consequently, determining whether the immediate danger of death actually materialized is not decisive for the outcome of the dispute concerning the attempt.
On the merits, the appellant argues that he did not have the direct intent to endanger his daughter, claiming that his actions were too weak and that he had voluntarily released the pressure of the chain to use his hands, a less dangerous method. The Federal Supreme Court rejects this argument. Firstly, the medical findings (bruising, petechiae, etc.) and the victim's testimony (respiratory distress) prove the considerable intensity of the violence exerted, which was objectively capable of causing a danger of death. Secondly, the Federal Supreme Court emphasizes that the switch from the chain to his hands was not a voluntary act of de-escalation, but the consequence of the victim's resistance as she managed to free herself.
The fact that the accused immediately continued his assault with his hands demonstrates, on the contrary, his perseverance and criminal determination, which supports the conclusion of the existence of direct intent. The fact that he did not pursue his daughter after she fled does not change the classification, as the threshold for an attempt had already been largely crossed by the acts of strangulation and choking. The trivial motive (anger) and the violence of the act confirm the "scrupulous" nature of the behavior.
Issue
The Federal Supreme Court dismisses the appeal to the extent that it is admissible. The conviction for attempted endangerment of life is upheld, as are the two-year suspended prison sentence, the seven-year expulsion order, and the allocation of costs. The request for legal aid is denied due to the appeal's lack of merit.
Silex newsletter published in collaboration with Claudia Malaguerra
