Federal Supreme Court, 13.04.2026, 1C_396/2025
Facts
In July 2022, a property owner filed a building permit application for the demolition of two existing buildings and the construction of a 15-unit senior housing complex on their plot in Bex. The municipality issued an initial authorization in February 2023, but this was annulled in April 2024 by the Administrative and Public Law Court of the Vaud Cantonal Court (CDAP), which referred the matter back to the municipality for a new decision. In the meantime, in March 2024, the municipality submitted a new municipal land-use plan (PACom) for public inquiry. This new plan, intended to replace the old one, classifies one of the buildings slated for demolition as a "Cultural Monument B," thereby rendering it protected. Despite the negative opinion of the Urban Planning Advisory Commission, which noted the project's incompatibility with the new plan, the municipality issued the building permit a second time in November 2024. Upon being seized of the matter again, the CDAP annulled this second authorization in a ruling dated June 10, 2025. The owner appealed this decision to the Federal Supreme Court. (Facts A, B, and C)
Legal Analysis
The Federal Supreme Court reiterates that, unless there is arbitrariness, it is bound by the facts established by the lower court and only reviews the application of cantonal law under this restricted scope. A decision is arbitrary if it is manifestly unsustainable or contradicts the sense of justice in a shocking manner. (c. 2.1) Vaud cantonal law, specifically the Law on Land Use Planning and Construction (LATC), provides specific rules for plans currently under development.Art. 49 para. 1 LATC requires the municipality to refuse a building permit for a project that contradicts a land-use plan already submitted for public inquiry. This provision grants the plan under revision a "negative anticipatory effect," aimed at preserving future planning and preventing contrary projects from compromising it. The authority must then adopt the plan within 12 months following the refusal of the permit (Art. 49 para. 2 LATC). (c. 2.2)
Application to the Case
The Federal Supreme Court finds that the reasoning of the cantonal court is not arbitrary. The central point is to determine which law was applicable at the time the municipality had to rule for the second time. The appellant incorrectly argues that since the new PACom was not yet in force, only the old law should have applied. The Federal Supreme Court rejects this argument, emphasizing that Art. 49 para. 1 LATC explicitly gives a negative anticipatory effect to a plan from the moment it is submitted for public inquiry. In this case, the new PACom was submitted for inquiry in March 2024, i.e., before the municipality issued its new decision in November 2024. (c. 2.4) The appellant is also mistaken in claiming that a permit had already been granted. The first authorization was annulled and therefore never entered into force; the municipality had to render an entirely new decision. At the time of this new decision, the project had become contrary to the law in force (the old plan supplemented by the negative anticipatory effect of the new plan), as it provided for the demolition of a now-protected building. The municipality was therefore required to refuse the permit. The fact that it granted it in error is not decisive, as the cantonal court correctly corrected this mistake. Finally, the appellant's criticisms regarding the classification of their plot and the building in the new plan are deemed inadmissible within the framework of the building permit procedure; they should have been raised during the plan adoption procedure. (c. 2.4)
Outcome
The Federal Supreme Court concludes that the cantonal court applied cantonal law without arbitrariness by confirming the refusal of the building permit. The project is incompatible with the new municipal planning which, although not yet in force, has deployed a negative anticipatory effect since its submission for public inquiry. The appeal is therefore dismissed to the extent that it is admissible. The court costs are charged to the appellant (c. 4).
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