Standing of a municipality to appeal: property owner contributions and the restrictive conditions of Art. 89 LTF

Federal Supreme Court, 24.03.2026, 9C_153/2026

Facts

In 2003, the town of Willisau (LU) began construction on Wydenmattstrasse. Subsequently, it established the contributions to be paid by the adjacent property owners to finance these works. Several owners, including A., the B. cooperative, and C.________ AG, challenged these tax assessments.

Following several proceedings, the Lucerne Cantonal Court ruled in favor of the property owners in a judgment dated January 20, 2026. It held that the town's right to collect these contributions had been extinguished by absolute prescription. To determine the limitation period, in the absence of specific provisions in cantonal legislation regarding property contributions, the Cantonal Court applied by analogy the rules of the cantonal tax law (StG/LU), which provides for an absolute limitation period of ten years, rather than the general provisions of the Code of Obligations. It thus found that the right to tax had expired on September 30, 2023, for part of the work and would expire no later than October 29, 2025, for the remainder.

The town of Willisau filed an appeal in public law matters with the Federal Supreme Court, requesting the annulment of the cantonal judgment and the referral of the case for a new decision.

Law

The Federal Supreme Court examines its jurisdiction and the admissibility conditions of the appeal ex officio and with full power of review, in particular the appellant's standing to appeal (Art. 89 of the Federal Supreme Court Act, FSCA).

For a municipality or other public law entity, standing to appeal in public law matters is governed by two distinct provisions of Art. 89 FSCA, which must be examined in a specific order:

1. Art. 89 para. 2 let. c FSCA (Appeal for violation of municipal autonomy): This special provision allows a municipality to appeal when it alleges a violation of the guarantees conferred upon it by cantonal or federal constitutions, primarily its autonomy. For the appeal to be admissible on this basis, it is sufficient for the municipality to explain in a sustainable manner how the contested act affects its autonomy. Whether the autonomy is actually violated is a question of substance, not admissibility. However, the violation of a constitutional right such as municipal autonomy must be expressly invoked and substantiated in a qualified manner by the appellant (Art. 106 para. 2 FSCA). The Federal Supreme Court does not examine such a violation ex officio.

1. Art. 89 para. 1 FSCA (General standing clause): This provision, designed primarily for private individuals, is open to public entities only in a very restrictive manner and under two alternative conditions:
   1. First variant: The entity is affected by the contested decision in the same or a similar manner as a private individual. This situation typically arises in areas with strong analogies to private law, such as civil service law, state liability, or expropriation law. Conversely, a mere financial or fiscal interest resulting from the exercise of a public authority task is insufficient, as the entity is then acting as a holder of sovereignty and not as a private individual.

1. Second variant: The entity is affected in a qualified manner in the performance of its public authority tasks. This condition is interpreted strictly. A mere interest in the correct application of the law is insufficient. Case law requires that the entity be "considerably affected" in "important public interests." This assumes the meeting of two cumulative elements:
   1. A factual component: the financial consequences of the dispute must be of considerable magnitude.
   2. A legal component: the legal issue raised must have a significance that extends beyond the specific case, with the potential to have major financial repercussions on the performance of public duties or to clarify a notable legal uncertainty.

Application to the specific case

The Federal Supreme Court analyzes the City of Willisau's standing to appeal in light of these principles.

1. Regarding Art. 89 para. 2 let. c of the Federal Supreme Court Act (LTF), the Court notes that the City of Willisau did not invoke a violation of its municipal autonomy guaranteed by the Lucerne Constitution (Art. 68 para. 2 Cst./LU). Due to the principle of qualified allegation (Art. 106 para. 2 LTF), the Federal Supreme Court cannot examine this issue on its own initiative. This avenue of appeal is therefore closed.

1. Regarding Art. 89 para. 1 LTF, the City of Willisau explicitly relies on this provision, arguing that it meets both criteria.
   1. The Federal Supreme Court rejects the argument that the city is affected like a private individual (first criterion). The comparison to a private developer pre-financing work is not relevant. By collecting contributions from property owners, the city is exercising a sovereign prerogative and defending a purely fiscal interest. This situation is precisely what case law excludes from the scope of this first criterion.

1. The Court then examines whether the city is affected in a qualified manner in its sovereign duties (second criterion). The collection of causal contributions is indeed a sovereign task. However, the city fails to demonstrate that it is "qualifiedly" or "considerably" affected.

1. Regarding the factual component: The city merely mentions the amount in dispute of approximately CHF 380,000. However, it does not explain the relative importance of this amount in relation to its overall budget. An absolute figure, without context, is not sufficient to demonstrate a considerable financial impact.

1. Regarding the legal component: The city does not demonstrate that the issue of the statute of limitations in cantonal contribution law has a significance beyond the specific case or that there is a major legal uncertainty requiring clarification by the highest judicial authority. The mere financial motivation of wanting to recover a debt is not enough to establish a qualified legal interest. The Federal Supreme Court also clarifies that the previous case law (notablyATF 134 II 45) invoked by the city does not establish general standing for municipalities acting as creditors of causal contributions.

The Federal Supreme Court concludes that the City of Willisau does not meet the conditions for any of the avenues of appeal potentially open to it under Art. 89 LTF. Its standing to appeal must therefore be denied.

Outcome

The Federal Supreme Court declares the appeal inadmissible. The court costs, amounting to CHF 3,000, are charged to the City of Willisau. No legal fees are awarded to the respondent property owners, as no exchange of briefs was ordered and they therefore incurred no costs for the federal proceedings.

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